

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 12882 01 OF 03 221336Z

53

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 125038

O 221215Z DEC 75

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8720

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 CAIRO 12882

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR EG US XF

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON'S MEETING

WITH PRESIDENT SADAT -- SUNDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1975

SUMMARY: IN HOUR-LONG MEETING WITH SADAT AT MIT ABUL KOM, I EXPLAINED REASONS WHY YOU HAD SENT ME ON SPECIAL MISSION AND GAVE HIM AN ACCOUNT OF MY TALKS IN DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND JIDDA. I HAD STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF NOT PERMITTING UPCOMING UNSC DEBATE TO GET OUT OF HAND TO A POINT WHERE WE WILL HAVE TO OPPOSE RESOLUTION. SADAT THOUGHT NOTHING WILL EMERGE FROM SC DEBATE, THOUGH A GREAT DEAL OF "AUCTIONEERING" WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE AND EGYPT MAY HAVE TO JOIN IN THIS. WE SHOULD CONSULT CLOSELY ON HANDLING DEBATE AND HE HAS ISSUED DIRECTIVE TO FAHMY TO ARRANGE THAT ABDUL MEGUID BE PROPERLY INSTRUCTED. WE SHOULD HANDLE DEBATE CALMLY AND NOT BE CONCERNED ABOUT SYRIAN DESIRE SHIFT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS FROM GENEVA TO SC. NO ONE WANTS THIS. HE WAS PLEASED THAT WE PLAN TO FULFILL SAUDI ARAMS CONTACTS, NOTING WE NEED HAVE NO FEAR ABOUT SUCH ARMS DELIVERIES. HE WAS SHARPLY CRITICAL OF HUSSEIN FOR HIS RECENT SINAI INDICTMENT AND SAID HE INTENDS TO GIVE HUSSEIN A LESSON. HUSSEIN CAN EASILY BE EXPOSED BEFORE THE ARAB WORLD. I URGED UTILITY OF ENABLING HUSSEIN TO KEEP HIS OPTIONS OPEN. ON

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 12882 01 OF 03 221336Z

LEBANON, I GAVE HIM OUR VIEWS. HE SHARED OUR VIEW THAT

ANY SETTLEMENT MUST FIRST COME FROM LEBANESE THEMSELVES.
THEREAFTER THEY SHOULD WORK THINGS OUT WITH PALESTINIANS.
SADAT OPINED SOVIETS REALLY DO NOT WANT TO GO TO GENEVA
AND ARE CONCERNED ABOUT WEAKENING OF THEIR POSITION
FOLLOWING SINAI II. HE ALSO WISHED US TO KNOW THAT
SOVIETS ARE NOW SENDING SQUADRON OF MIG-25S TO LIBYA,
WHICH WILL BE MAINLY DIRECTED AT SPYING ON US. ONCE
THESE AIRCRAFT ARRIVE, USG SHOULD TAKE SOME KIND OF
ACTION, BUT HE COULD NOT SPECIFY WHAT. LIBYANS HAVE
ALSO PROVIDED POLISARIO WITH WEAPONS, INCLUDING TANKS.
IN CONCLUSION, SADAT AFFIRMED HE INTENDS TO
ADHERE TO THE SALZBURG STRATEGY AND RECOMMENDED WE
CONSULT TOGETHER ON APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS. COMING
DIRECTLY AFTER RECENT US VETO, HE APPLAUDED YOUR
SENDING ME OUT AND TERMED IT A "CLEVER GESTURE." END SUMMARY.

1. I MET WITH PRESIDENT SADAT FOR ABOUT AN HOUR
DEC 21 AT HIS VILLAGE OF MIT ABUL KOM. HERMANN
ACCOMPANIED ME AND EGYPTIANS PROVIDED HELICOPTER
FOR THE TRIP. SUMMARY OF MY TALK FOLLOWS:

2. I FIRST CONVEYED PRESIDENT FORD'S AND YOUR WARM GREETINGS,
FOR WHICH THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED APPRECIATION. HE
THEN WANTED TO KNOW WHAT I HAD DONE. I EXPLAINED THAT
YOU HAD ASKED ME TO MAKE THIS TRIP. YOU FELT THAT NOT
TOO MUCH TIME SHOULD ELAPSE WITHOUT SOME HIGH LEVEL
EXCHANGE WITH OUR FRIENDS. THERE WERE ALSO TWO ADDITIONAL
REASONS PROPTING THE TRIP: A) THE JANUARY UNSC
DEBATE AND B) SAUDI CONCERNS ABOUT VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE
MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. I
HAD JUST BEEN IN DAMSCUS, AMMAN AND JIDDA AND WOULD
BE LEAVING FOR ISRAEL TOMORROW.

3. UNSC DEBATE: YOU HAD FELT IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT
TO TALK ABOUT THIS SUBJECT IN DAMSCUS. WE SEE UNSC
SESSION AS A MEETING WHICH COULD BE VERY IMPORTANT,
EITHER IN A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE SENSE. IF IT PROVES
TO BE THE LATTER, IT COULD FURTHER FREEZE THE SITUATION.
WE HOPE IT WILL BE SO CONDUCTED AS TO PLAY A
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. THIS IS THE SPIRIT IN WHICH WE WILL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 12882 01 OF 03 221336Z

APPROACH THE MEETING. WE WANT TO BE SURE THE SYRIANS
UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THE SITUATION, INCLUDING THE OUTER
LIMITS OF WHAT WE CAN DO. MY MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO GET
THIS MESSAGE ACROSS AND TO DESCRIBE THE DANGER OF A
STALEMENT IF THE DEBATE IS HANDLED BADLY. WE HOPE
THE UNSC WILL PRESERVE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

4. I HAD EXPLAINED TO ASAD SOME ASPECTS THAT COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS -- SPECIFICALLY, ANY EFFORT TO CHANGE RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 IN A SUBSTANTIVE WAY OR TO FORCE PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. AS THE PRESIDENT KNEW, WE VOTED FOR THE NOVEMBER 30 RESOLUTION WHICH CALLS FOR DISCUSSION OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. WE RECOGNIZE RESOLUTION OF PALESTINIAN QUESTION MUST BE PART OF ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT. THE PROBLEM IS ONE WITH WHICH PRESIDENT SADAT IS FAMILIAR. THE PLO CAN HARDLY BE BROUGHT INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHEN IT HAS NOT ACCEPTED THE BASIC NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK. AS PRESIDENT FORD AND YOU HAVE OFTEN SAID, IF THE PLO COULD ACCEPT PUBLICLY THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL THIS WOULD BE A POSITIVE STEP. WE COULD MAKE IMPORTANT RECIPROCAL GESTURES. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT A RESOLUTION COULD BE PROPOSED WHICH WE WOULD BE FORCED TO VETO. YOU ALSO WANTED ME TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SYRIANS THAT SEEKING TO SHIFT THE PEACE PROCESS FROM GENEVA TO THE UNSC IS NOT PRACTICAL.

5. SADAT OPINED NOTHING WILL COME OUT OF SC DEBATE, BUT A GREAT DEAL OF "AUCTIONEERING" WILL TAKE PLACE. DID WE HAVE ANYTHING IN MIND? I MENTIONED THAT I HAD ALSO TALKED WITH KHADDAM AND THAT I THOUGHT YOUR MESSAGE HAD BEEN CLEARLY DELIVERED. I GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SYRIANS HAD NOT WORKED OUT SPECIFIC TACTICS OR RESOLUTION LANGUAGE. ASAD'S REACTIONS WAS THAT HE DOES NOT SEE HOW TO BRIDGE OUR POSITION AND SYRIAN POINT OF VIEW. HE WANTS THE DEBATE TO RESULT IN BRINGING THE PLO INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WAS NEGATIVE ON GENEVA AND, WHILE NOT COMPLETELY CLOSING THE DOOR, PREFERS THE UNSC.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 CAIRO 12882 01 OF 03 221336Z

6. OBSERVING THAT FAHMY MUST HAVE TOLD US THE EGYPTIAN IDEAS (HE HAD NOT YET DONE SO), SADAT RECALLED THAT WHILE IN THE US HE HAD URGED WALDHHEIM TO COME TO THE AREA BEFORE THE UNDOF DEBATE. THIS WOULD OFFER ASAD A FACESAVING DEVICE. THROUGH THEIR OWN MANEUVERS, SYRIANS HAVE PAINTED THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER. AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST GOLAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, ASAD WAS IN CONTROL. SINCE THAT TIME, HE HAS LOST CONTROL OF HIS DOMESTIC SITUATION. SADAT REMAINS CONVINCED THAT THE SYRIANS WANT ANOTHER DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. WHILE THEY RECOGNIZE NOTHING WILL COME OUT OF THE UNSC DEBATE, THEY WANT TO APPEAR PROGRESSIVE AND THE CHAMPIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS. ALL OF THE SYRIAN TALK ABOUT THE PLO JOINING EVERYTHING IS SOLELY FOR LOCAL

CONSUMPTION. THE PRESIDENT OBSERVED GOE HAD ALREADY
ACHIEVED PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE UNSC
EVEN PRIOR TO THE UPCOMING DEBATE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 12882 02 OF 03 221353Z

42

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 125119

O 221215Z DEC 75
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8721

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 CAIRO 12882

NODIS/CHEROKEE

7. SADAT STRESSED THAT THERE SHOULD BE CLOSE CONTACT
BETWEEN US IN THE INTERVAL BEFORE THE JANUARY DEBATE.
HE HAD INSTRUCTED FAHMY TO SEND APPROPRIATE
INSTRUCTIONS TO ABDUL MEGUID. HE ASKED THAT I
SPECIFICALLY INFORM YOU THAT IF AT ANY TIME IT APPEARS
EGYPT IS ALSO "AUCTIONEERING," IT IS DOING SO FOR
THE PURPOSE OF PUTTING THE SYRIANS IN THEIR PLACE.
GOE KNOWS FULL WELL WHAT THE RESULT WILL BE. CHANGES
IN RESOLUTIUNS 242 AND 338 ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US,
SOVIETS, BRITISH, FRENCH, ETC. HIS DIRECTIVE TO FAHMY
CALLS FOR EXERCISING "MANEUVER" DURING THE DEBATE.

8. I OBSERVED THAT WE ARE CONCERNED THAT TOO MUCH
AUCTIONEERING MIGHT FORCE US INTO A VETO POSITION. I
REVIEWED FOR SADAT THE POINTS YOU INSTRUCTED ME TO
MAKE TO ASAD, POINTING OUT INTER ALIA THAT WHAT THE
SYRIANS SEEM TO HAVE IN MIND COULD RESULT IN RENEWED
POLARIZATION AND A RETURN TO THE PRE-1973 SITUATION.
SADAT AGREED, BUT SAID THAT ASAD HAS NO POWER IN HIS
PARTY AT THE MOMENT. NOR HAS THE BA'ATH PARTY ANY
LONG RANGE STRATEGY. INSTEAD IT WORKS ON A DAY-BY-DAY
BASIS. WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE IRAQIS CRITICIZE SOME-
THING, THE SYRIAN BA'ATH PARTY CHANGES AT ONCE. HE,
SADAT, DOES NOT FER THIS. HE INTENDS TO CUT THE
SYRIANS DOWN TO SIZE. ASAD CANNOT HOPE TO TRANSFER THE

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS FROM GENEVA TO THE UNSC. NO ONE
IS READY FOR THIS. HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR CLOSER
CONTACT BETWEEN US TO "PUT SYRIAN IN ITS SIZE." SADAT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 12882 02 OF 03 221353Z

URGED THAT WE HANDLE THE UNSC MATTER IN A "CALM" WAY.
WE SHOULD AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION US IS SOLELY ON
ISRELI SIDE. HE WOULD NOT TELL US WHETHER WE SHOULD
VETO OR NOT, BUT HOPED THIS COULD BE AVOIDED.

9. JORDAN:I TOLD SADAT THAT, IN MY MEETING WITH KING
HUSSEIN AND ZAID RIFA'I IN AMMAN, I HAD MADE THE SAME
POINTS I HAD IN DAMASCUS. IT SEEMED DESIRABLE TO DO SO
SINCE THE JORDANIANS AND THE SYRIANS HAD BEEN EXCHANGING
VIEWS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE JORDANIANS
ALSO UNDERSTAND CLEARLY OUR POSITION AND LIMITS. I HAD
ALSO MADE CLEAR TO HUSSEIN OUR DISPLEASURE WITH THE
JOINT COMMUNIQUE CRITICIZING SINAI II AND HAD URGED JORDAN TO
MAINTAIN A CERTAIN FLEXIBILITY.

10. SADAT STATED IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT HUSSEIN HAD
AGREED TO THE STATEMENT CRITICIZING SINAI AND PRIOR TO
THAT HAD ALSO DONE SO IN AN INTERVIEW. UP TO NOW,
THE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD BEEN CALM. HUSSEIN COULD
BE ATTACKED BY ANYONE. HE HAD JUST CHANGED HIS
AMBASSADOR IN JORDAN. HE WOULD NOT WELCOME A NEW
JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR IN EGYPT SOON. HE WANTED FIRST
TO SEE HOW FAR HUSSEIN GOES WITH THE SYRIANS. HUSSEIN
CAN BE EASILY ATTACKED AND IS NOT AN ARAB HERO. HE
HAS MADE CLER TO ZAID RIFA'I DURING THE LATTER'S
VISIT TO CAIRO THAT HE WOULD NOT TOLERATE "BLACKMAIL"
BY THE BA'ATH PARTY. HUSSEIN, THE PRESIDENT OBSERVED
SARCASTICALLY, IS TRYING TO MAKE A HERO OF HIMSELF,
BUT "WE KNOW HOW TO DEAL WITH HIM." HE INTENDS TO
GIVE HUSSEIN A "LESSON." IN 1973, HE HAD STOOD BY
HUSSEIN THE FACE OF ASAD'S PRESSURE ON THE JORDANIAN
MONARCH TO ENTER THE CONFLICT. HUSSEIN CAN BE EASILY
EXPOSED.

11. I OBSERVED THAT, IN MY JUDGMENT, HUSSEIN
ULTIMATELY WILL DO WHAT IS IN JORDAN'S BEST INTERESTS.
THE KING MAY NEED A LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT ON THIS POINT.
I HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT HUSSEIN IS BEGINNING TO
HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT TYING HIMSELF
TO SYRIA. IT WAS USEFUL TO HELP HIM KEEP HIS OPTIONS
OPEN. SADAT SAID THERE ARE BUILT-IN "CONTRADICTIONS"
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 12882 02 OF 03 221353Z

BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND ASAD. IT IS SIMPLY A MATTER OF TIME.

12. SAUDI ARABIA: ALLUDING TO MY SAUDI VISIT, I OBSERVED THAT THE SAUDIS ARE ANXIOUS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND VARIOUS BILATERAL MATTERS -- SPECIFICALLY, RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON VISA DISCRIMINATION AND THE BOYCOTT. I RECOUNTED IN SUMMARY TO SADAT THE POINTS I HAD MADE ON THESE SUBJECTS IN A LONG MEETING WITH FAHD PER YOUR GUIDANCE TO ME. I TRIED TO GET ACROSS THAT THE ISSUE MUST BE SEEN IN PERSPECTIVE; THEY SHOULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THE USG IS TURNING AGAINST THEM. ON THE CONTRARY, I ASSURED FAHD THAT PRESIDENT FORD, YOU AND THE ADMINISTRATION ARE DOING YOUR UTMOST TO EXPLAIN TO CONGRESS THE HARM THESE ACTIONS CAN DO TO OUR OVERALL INTERESTS. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NO DESIRE TO CHANGE US POLICY TOWARD SAUDI ARABIA. I HAD ALSO DISCUSSED VARIOUS MILITARY SUPPLY CONTRACTS AND HAD BEEN ABLE TO GIVE PRINCE SULTAN SOME PRECISE POSITIVE DECISIONS ON MANY OF THEM.

13. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION. THE SAUDIS HAD COMPLAINED TO GOE ABOUT THE MILITARY SUPPLY MATTER, AND HE HAD INTENDED TO RAISE IT WITH US. SADAT URGED THAT WE TRY TO CONCLUDE ALL OF OUR MILITARY AGREEMENTS WITH THE SAUDIS. THEY BELIEVE WE HAVE DESERTED THEM. WE NEED NOT FEAR ANYTHING FROM ARMS REACHING SAUDI ARABIA. ADDITIONALLY, THE PRESIDENT OBSERVED THAT KUWAIT HAD RECENTLY CONCLUDED A MAJOR ARMS AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS. RECALLING RECURRENT SAUDI-KUWAITI DIFFERENCES, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE SAUDIS RECEIVING THE AMERICAN ARMS THEY DESIRE.

14. SADAT NOTED THAT GOE HAS COMPLETE COORDINATION WITH THE SAUDIS. KING KHALED HAD SENT HIM WORD ABOUT HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO JORDAN AND SYRIA. THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF THIS VISIT IS TO DISCUSS THE LEBANESE SITUATION. HE HAD ADVISED KHALED TO SPEAK FOR EGYPT AS WELL. WHATEVER HELP KHALED MAY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 CAIRO 12882 02 OF 03 221353Z

WANT ON THIS MATTER, EGYPT IS READY TO PROVIDE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 12882 03 OF 03 221414Z

42

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 125306

O 221215Z DEC 75

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8722

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 CAIRO 12882

NODIS/CHEROKEE

15. LEBANON: WHEN NOTING PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF KHALED'S UPCOMING VISIT TO SYRIA AND JORDAN IS TO DISCUSS LEBANESE SITUATION, SADAT ASKED ABOUT OUR POSITION ON THIS MATTER. I POINTED OUT THAT WE ARE AT A LOSS AS TO WHAT WE CAN DO. WE ARE VERY CONCERNED. WE HAVE TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR TO ALL PARTIES THAT POLITICAL ACCOMMODATIONS MUST BE A PART OF ANY RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. IT WILL REQUIRE SOME CHANGE IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF LEBANON TO REFLECT MODIFICATIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE '40S. WE DID NOT WANT THE PHALANGE TO BELIEVE WE WOULD AGAIN LAND MARINES. BUT ANY SOLUTION SHOULD PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE COMMUNITIES. WE HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT ANY OUTSIDE INTERVENTION CAN ONLY MAKE THINGS WORSE; PROBLEMS MUST BE SOLVED BY LEBANESE. I HAD IN FACT MET IN AMMAN WITH AMBASSADOR GODLEY IN AN UNPUBLICIZED MEETING TO DISCUSS THE MATTER. GODLY IS IN BASIC AGREEMENT.

16. SADAT AGREED. ANY SETTLEMENT, HE STATED, MUST FIRST BE BETWEEN THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES, AFTER WHICH THEY SHOULD SIT DOWN WITH THE PALESTINIANS TO WORK OUT THAT ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM.

17. ISRAEL: SADAT ASKED THAT I CONVEY TO PRESIDENT FORD AND TO YOU HIS APPEAL THAT WE CONTROL ISRAELIS, ESPECIALLY AFTER THEY LEAKED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ABOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 12882 03 OF 03 221414Z

SITUATION IS NOW ONEWHERE, IF ISRAELIS RAID, THEY WILL CLAIM IT IS ACCORDING TO THE US LETTER AND THAT WE AGREED. HE CALLED THE ISRAELIS "CUNNING AND TREACHEROUS." I POINTED OUT THAT THE LEAK HAD GIVEN THE WRONG IMPRESSION. WE HAD NOT SAID WE SHOULD CONSULT IN CONNECTION WITH AN PROPOSED. ON THE CONTRARY, WE DISAPPROVED OF THE ATTACKS. WE HAD SIMPLY SAID THAT CLOSER CONSULTATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ISRAELI POLICIES IS NEEDED.

18. SADT SEEMED PLEASED TO HEAR MY EXPLANATION. HE RECALLED HE HAD RECEIVED PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER AFTER THE VETO AND UNDERSTANDS THE MOTIVES PROMPTING IT. THROUGH THE VETO WE HAVE GIVEN THE ISRAELIS SOMETHING. IN OUR OVERALL STRATEGY, HOWEVER, HE CONSIDERED THE VETO AS A MINOR ISSUE. BUT, HE REITERATED, WE SHOULD NOT USE THE VETO AGAIN WITHOUT CLEARLY EXPLAINING TO THE ARAB WORLD WHY WE ARE DOING SO.

19. I NOTED THAT ALLON IS COMING TO THE US IN JANUARY. THIS WILL BE AN OCCASION FOR SOME SERIOUS AND HARD TALKS.

20. SOVIETS: I NOTED YOU HAD ASKED ME TO TELL THE PRESIDENT ABOUT YOUR MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN JUST PRIOR TO THE EUROPEAN TRIP. THE MAIN PURPOSE HAD BEEN TO TALK ABOUT SALT AND WHY YOU WERE DELAYING YOUR MOSCOW TRIP, BUT THE SOVIETS PROPOSED AT THAT TIME BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN US ON PREPARATIONS FOR GENEVA. WE HAVE AS YET GIVEN NO REPLY AND WILL KEEP GOE INFORMED ON THIS MATTER.

21. SADAT COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIETS REALLY DO NOT WANT TO GO TO GENEVA. HE RECALLED HE HAD ALREADY EXCLUDED THEM FROM EGYPT AS A RESULT OF SINAI II. THE SOVIETS ARE FURIOUS ABOUT THE AMERICAN TECHNICIANS WHO WILL BE DEPLOYED TO THE SINAI.

22. SOVIET MIGS: SADAT SAID HE WISHED TO APPRISE PRESIDENT FORD AND YOU OF THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LIBYA. ON THE DAY HE HAD ARRIVED IN THE US, A SOVIET
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 12882 03 OF 03 221414Z

DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER HAD SECRETLY ARRIVED IN LIBYA. THE SOVIETS HAD TOLD QADHAAFY THAT A SQUADRON OF MIG 25S WILL BE PROVIDED. THE LIBYANS CANNOT FLY THESE AIRCRAFT. THE FOUR SUCH MIG 25S THAT HAD BEEN DEPLOYED TO EGYPT HAD BEEN USED SOLELY BY SOVIET PILOTS. EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN

PREVENTED FROM COMING NEAR THEM. GIVEN THE 2,000 KILOMETER LONG LIBYAN COASTLINE, SADAT SUGGESTED THE MIG 25S' DEPLOYMENT WAS DIRECTED "MAINLY AGAINST US." THE SITUATION NEEDS WATCHING.

23. ADDITIONALLY, SHORTLY AFTER THE RECENT VISIT OF BOUMEDIENNE, THE ALGERIANS RECEIVED VARIOUS ARMAMENTS FROM THE LIBYANS, PRESUMABLY WITH SOVIET CONCURRENCE, INCLUDING 30 TANKS TO GIVE TO THE POLISARIO. THEY ARE TO BE USED AGAINST HASSAN. SADAT SAID HE COULD NOT FORETELL WHAT BOUMEDIENNE'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE IN THE FUTURE. AFTER PRIMIN SALEM'S MEETING WITH BOUMEDIENNE, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE LATTER BEARS A PERSONAL GRUDGE AGAINST HASSAN. WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO ALL SOVIET, LIBYAN AND ALGERIAN ACTIVITIES.

24. WHEN THE MIG 25S COME, WE SHOULD TAKE SOME SORT OF ACTION. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THIS MIGHT BE, BUT THIS WAS A MATTER FOR US TO DECIDE.

25. FUTURE STRATEGY: SADAT RECALLED PRESIDENT FORD, HE AND YOU HAD AGREED UPON A STRATEGY. IN THINKING OF HOW TO KEEP THE SITUATION QUIET, HE HAD HOPED DURING 1976 TO BE ABLE TO WORK THROUGH GENEVA TO BRING THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND TO DEVELOP A FRAMEWORK OF WHERE TO GO FROM THERE. WITH SYRIA'S OBJECTION TO RECONVENING GENEVA, SADAT INDICATED WE SHOULD CONSULT ON WHAT MIGHT BE AN APPROPRIATE NEXT STEP. I SAID THAT WE AGREED THERE MUST BE SOME APPEARANCE OF MOVEMENT IN 1976. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT NOTHING COMES OUT OF THE UNSC DEBATE WHICH WOULD DESTROY NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK AND CLOSE ANY OPTIONS.

26. SADAT COMMENTED THAT, AFTER OUR RECENT VETO, MY TRIP TO THE AREA WAS A "CLEVER GESTURE" AND APPLAUDED
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 CAIRO 12882 03 OF 03 221414Z

YOUR DECISION TO SEND ME. HE STRONGLY ADVISED, HOWEVER, THAT WE NOT USE THE VETO AGAIN. IF, HOWEVER, THE SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS "AUCTIONEER" AND THEREFORE IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO DO SO, WE SHOULD EXPLAIN WHY WE HAVE TO USE THE VETO. I NOTED THAT THE REASON FOR MY TRIP WAS TO TRY TO EXPLAIN IN ADVANCE WHAT KIND OF MOVES IN SC WE WOULD HAVE TO OPPOSE. THIS SEEMED PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE WITH KHALED ABOUT TO GO TO SYRIA.

27. THE PRESIDENT ASKED THAT I INFORM PRESIDENT FORD AND YOU THAT HE WILL ADHERE TO THE STRATEGY AGREED

UPON AT SALZBURG. WE SHOULD NOT GIVE HEED TO ANYTHING THAT IS SAID IN THE MIDDLE EAST AREA ABOUT HIS POSITION. "MY COUNTRY SUPPORTS ME 100 PERCENT" AND EGYPTIANS ARE IN FACT ANGRY ABOUT OTHER ARAB CRITICISMS. AFTER HIS VISIT TO THE US, HE HAD SENT MUBAREK AND THE PRIMIN TO THE ARAB WORLD TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION. ALL OF THE STATES VISITED, IN SADAT'S VIEW, NOW UNDERSTAND.

28. COMMENT: MEETING WAS CORDIAL AND RELAXED. SADAT WAS ALERT AND SEEMED TO BE IN GOOD SPIRITS. HE WAS INTERESTED IN MY ACCOUNT AND APPRECIATIVE THAT YOU HAD SENT ME. ON HIS PART, HE WAS FORTHCOMING, BUT MORE IN A GENERAL THAN A SPECIFIC SENSE. SPECIFIC TACTICS HE LEAVES TO FAHMY.

EILTS

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, MEETING REPORTS, UNSC RESOLUTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, CAT-C, CHEROKEE 12/22/75
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 DEC 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GarlanWA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975CAIRO12882
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P840083-0651
From: CAIRO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751220/aaaaardt.tel
Line Count: 508
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GarlanWA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 APR 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <08 JUL 2003 by GarlanWA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT--SUNDAY, DECEMBER 21, L975
TAGS: PFOR, PREL, AORC, EG, US, XF, UN, (SADAT, ANWAR), (ATHERTON, ALFRED L JR)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006